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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND NATURE OF CASE 
This appeal is taken by the Defendants from the lower court's 
Memorandum Decision and Declaratory Judgment granting summary 
judgment for the Plaintiff. The judgment of the lower court, dated May 11, 
1988, was a final Order and a Judgment from which an appeal could proceed. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
under Utah Code Section 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii) and 78-2-2(3)(j). 
The Defendants (collectively referred to herein as the "State" 
unless otherwise indicated) through the Director of State Lands, issued an 
audit of State Coal Lease ML-18148 (hereinafter referred to as the "State 
Lease") to the Plaintiff (herein referred to as "Blackhawk") and demanded 
payment of alleged unpaid royalties. Blackhawk challenged the audit in an 
action for declaratory judgment against the State. Blackhawk prevailed and 
the trial court granted its Motion for Summary Judgment and entered a 
judgment reversing the decision of the Director which had upheld the 
Division of State Lands' audit. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Blackhawk is not satisfied with the State's Statement of Issues 
contained in Brief of Appellants and, in pursuance of Rule 24(b) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court, includes herein its own Statement of Issues, to 
wit: 
(1) Did the District Court properly find the royalty provision in 
the State Lease ambiguous? 
(2) Did the District Court properly construe the royalty 
provision in light of the parties' actions and performance? 
(3) Did the District Court properly find that the royalty 
provision was not self executing? 
(4) Did the District Court properly find that the State may not 
retroactively apply its new policy imposing a royalty rate of eight percent? 
(5) Did the District Court properly find that the prevailing 
Federal royalty rate during the Audit Period was not eight percent. 
(6) Did the District Court properly rule that the State is 
prohibited from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the 
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by Blackhawk and accepted by 
the State, by reason of estoppel, laches, waiver, and the Statute of 
Limitations? 
(7) Did the District Court properly rule that the States ruling 
relative to imposing interest and penalties for any royalty payment 
deficiencies cannot be legally enforced? 
(8) Did the District Court properly find that the States new 
royalty policy is a rule which was invalid in that the State failed to comply 
with the provisions of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This controversy stems from attempts by The Utah Division of 
State Lands and Forestry ("the Division") to retroactively readjust the royalty 
rate on the State Lease and from the Division's claim for an alleged 
underpayment of royalties and interest thereon. 
The subject lease was entered into on February 16, 1960, 
between the State Land Board, as Lessor, and Carbon Development Company, 
as Lessee. (Addendum 1) Blackhawk succeeded to the intrests of said 
Lessee and Blackhawk's affiliate, Price River Coal Company, operated a mine 
on the leased premises until 1983, when production under the subject lease 
ceased. 
The terms of the State Lease provide for the payment to the 
State of a royalty in the amount of $0.15 per ton "or at the rate prevailing, at 
the beginning of the quarter for which payment is being made, for Federal 
Lessees of land of similar character under coal leases issued by the United 
States at that time, whichever is higher. The lease form provides that the 
State may readjust lease terms and conditions at the end of each twenty-
year period. It is to be noted that the State Lease was originally approved 
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry ("The Board") at a royalty rate of 
$0.15 per ton of 2,000 lbs, of coal produced from the leased premises and 
sold or otherwise disposed of. Under the readjustment provision, the lease 
was subject to readjustment on December 31. 1979. No readjustment was 
made by the State on or before that date; Blackhawk continued to pay the 
specified production royalty at $0.15 per ton to the Division and the 
Division accepted such payments without protest or objection after the 
readjustment date—in fact, up to the date mining operations ceased in 
1983. 
More than one year after the date of readjustment had passed, (on January 
14, 1981) the Division notified Franklin Real Estate Company (Blackhawk's 
predecessor) that the Division intended to amend the lease to conform with 
the State Coal Lease form then in use. (Addendum 2) The proposed 
amendment would have dramatically increased the production royalty 
from the specified $0.15 per ton to eight percent of the gross value of the 
coal removed, with an escalator clause whereby the royalty rate would 
increase to twelve and one-half percent of the gross value. Blackhawk 
protested this tardy attempt at readjustment on the basis of the holding in 
Rosebud Coal Sales Company v. Andrus, No. C79-160B (D. Wyo. June 10, 
1980) which was appealed to and affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court in 
Rosebud Coal Sales Company v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 949 (1982). Blackhawk 
also argued that the State had failed to provide any reasonable economic 
analysis or basis for this excessive increase in royalty rate. Upon 
consideration of these arguments at a July 8, 1981 hearing, the Board 
directed the Division to draft a new lease, the terms of which would 
contemplate a royalty rate of four percent of the coal removed for the first 
five years and eight percent thereafter. As a condition precedent to any 
lease adjustments, it was also decided to request an opinion from the Attor-
ney General considering the legality of the State's readjustment of lease 
terms at a time more than a year after the specified date of readjustment. 
The Attorney General did not issue an opinion. Eventually, the Division 
withdrew its demand that Blackhawk accept readjustment of the lease 
4 
terms, including the amended royalty rate under the terms of its proposed 
lease form. 
In its letter of January 4, 1982, signed by John T. Blake, 
Minerals Resource Specialist, the Division Stated, in relevant part, that: 
The Attorney General's Office... is not prepared to issue a formal 
opinion on this subject at this time. Consequently, we are not 
demanding that Blackhawk CoaJ Company accept readjustment 
of the lease at this time. 
My letter of December 11, 1981, was mereiy an invitation 
for Biackhawk CoaJ Company to amend this Jease with our current 
standardiease form, concurrent with the new year, at the readjusted 
royalty authorized by the Land Board... ShouidBiackhawk CoaJ 
Company choose to reject my invitation for iease amendment, they 
may continue to operate under the original iease agreement untii 
otherwise advised. (Emphasis applied) (Addendum 3) (R.297) 
Biackhawk s counsel of record responded for the Company in a 
letter of January 4, 1982, stating in part that: 
Biackhawk will continue to pay to the State, on a 
quarterly basis, the royalty of 15* per ton in compliance with 
Article II 1(a) of the original Lease Agreement, since the 
provisions of Article 111(b) of this Agreement are inapplicable 
at the present time. (R. 299) 
Nothing further was heard from the Division or the Board in this 
respect until nearly four years later when the October 15, 1985 Audit Report 
was issued. 
At all times that mining operations were conducted under said 
State Lease, including the period the State attempted a lease readjustment or 
amendment and during the period covered by the audit (January 1979 to 
December 1984, "the audit period") the Division accepted, without objection 
or dispute, Blackhawk's royalty payments at the rate of $0.15 per ton. The 
royalty so paid was clearly identified with each quarterly royalty payment 
on the statement submitted by Biackhawk to the Division. That rate was 
affirmed in Blackhawk's counsel's letter of January 7, 1982. 
The Division proceeded with its audit of the lease during 1985 
and issued an Audit Report, together with a letter from the Director of the 
Division dated October 15, 1985, in which he discussed the filing of the audit. 
(R. 303) 
Biackhawk protested the audit's findings. The division 
concluded that no adjustments to the audit would be made and issued its 
demand letter of March 27, 1986. (R. 303) This demand letter was 
recinded and a new letter issued May 16, 1986, demanding $1,940,43599 
for alleged underpayment or royalty and $1,210,306.94 for accrued interest, 
for a total of $3,150,742.93. (R. 314) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the following summary, each argument is offered 
independently of the others; each argument has its own basis in fact and law 
which is supportive of the District Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Judgment (Addendum 4 and 5): 
A. The royalty provision of Article III Second (b) of the State 
Lease is vague and ambiguous on its face and is therefor unenforceable. 
B. Due to its vagueness and uncertainty, said lease provision 
should be construed narrowly against the State and, by its terms and the 
conduct of the parties, held to be a royalty of $0.15 per ton. 
C. The phrase "at the rate prevailing" as contained in the lease 
royalty provision, is not self executing; Blackhawk was under no duty to pay 
royalties under the prevailing Federal rate until the parties had determined 
what, in fact, was the prevailing rate. 
D. The State is estopped from retroactively applying the 
prevailing Federal rate clause and demanding royalties in excess of its $0.15 
per ton rate for the reason that the State was fully cognizant of Blackhawk s 
royalty payments and had accepted such payments at the $0.15 per ton rate 
at all times during the audit period. Blackhawk will suffer serious financial 
injury if the State, at this late date, is allowed to retroactively invoke a 
Federal royalty rate. 
E. The State, in basing its demand upon the Federal prevailing 
rate clause, acknowledges its awareness of that clause, but failed to invoke it 
in a proper and timely manner, consequently, the State is barred by laches, 
waiver and the Statute of Limitations from demanding royalty payments at a 
rate in excess of the agreed $0.15 per ton. 
F. The States rule, attempting to impose an interest penalty —a 
rule promulgated long after the issuance of the State lease and contrary to 
the lease itself— is invalid and cannot be legally enforced. 
G. The States royalty policy rule is invalid because of the 
States failure to comply with the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act and 
cannot be applied retroactively. 
ARGUMENT! 
I. The Standard of Review Urged bv the State is Inapplicable. 
On page 8 of Appellants Brief, the State initiates a discussion of 
Standard of Review, the essence of which is that the "issues before the court 
have been decided against Plaintiff by the Director of State Lands. The 
Court, when reviewing the decision of the Director, should not overrule the 
Director's interpretation of the Division's rules, policies and regulations, 
unless his decision is arbitrary or erroneous". (State's Brief, P. 9.) 
This argument was rejected by the lower court. It is predicated 
on an erroneous factual and legal premise. 
The Audit Report, which was transacted under cover of 
Division's letter of October 15, 1985, stated in part that: 
The purpose of the examination of Blackhawk Coal Company was to 
establish the validity of royalty reports submitted from January 1, 
1979 through December 31, 1984, and to determine if lease terms had 
been adhered to. (R. 305) 
Blackhawk disagreed with the Audit Report and 
requested reconsideration of the report by the Division. By letter of 
i The State's Brief is replete with assertions which are not substantiated by 
Record references as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. The Brief of Plateau Mining Company, et al with which this 
case is consolidated, contains an Appendix which itemizes such unsupported 
assertions. Appellee will not burden this brief with such a list, but will point 
to this Court's holding in FackreJJv. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 
1987) to the effect that should Appellant fail to provide adequate references 
to the Record, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct. 
March 27, 1986, Blackhawk was notified that no adjustments would be 
made to the audit and demanded payment. The Director of the Division 
notified Blackhawk by letter of May 16, 1986, that the Divisions previous 
demand letter was recinded. (R. 314) The action was necessitated by the 
effect of Adkins v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524 
(Utah 1986). The Division issued a new demand letter as of May 16, 1986, 
for the amount claimed under the Audit Report. 
Blackhawk did submit a brief to the Division entitled 
"Statements of Reasons For Blackhawk Coal Company's Objection to 
Retroactive Royalty Increases" and counsel for Blackhawk met informally 
with the Director and several of his associates to discuss the matter, but 
there was no record for the Court to review, other than Blackhawk's request 
for reconsideration and the agency's two letters. There were no affidavits or 
exhibits. No testimony was taken. 
The State would obscure the point by urging that "This Court 
should only inquire as to whether the Director acted in excess of his powers 
in upholding the audit" citing Mcknight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d at 731 
(Utah 1963) and Atlantic Richfield Company v. Hinkel 432 F.2d 587 at 591 
(10th Cir. 1970) (State's brief P. 9) 
In Denver and R G. W. R R Co. v. Central Weber Sewer 
Improvement District, et al 2%1 P.2d 884 (1955) this Court held that if the 
record made revealed that the Sewer Commission had concluded a hearing, 
taken evidence, heard witnesses under oath, and had proceeded in 
accordance with due process requirements, and had the facts either 
supported or negatived the Commission's findings and conclusions, the 
reviewing court could have examined only the record before it to determine 
if the Commission regularly had pursued its authority, or had abused its 
discretion. In contradistinction, this Court then said "but when, as here, 
there is nothing to review but an ipse dixit, a due process would be denied if 
the reviewing court could not get at the facts. To hold otherwise, invites rule 
by men, not laws..." (At page 887) This court has already answered one 
of the State's contentions in Adkins, supra, saying: "We generally give 
deference to an administrative agency's construction of a statute where its 
technical expertise is helpful or where the statute indicates the legislative 
intention to commit broad discretion to an agency to effectuate the purposes 
of the legislative scheme. However, on questions of statutory construction, 
involving pure questions of law, we owe no deference to the administrative 
determination." (At page 527) Citing Salt Lake CityCorporation v. 
Department of Employment Security of Utah 657 P.2d 1312(1982). 
The State's position is rooted in the proposition that the Director 
has correctly decided the issues of contract construction, statutory 
interpretation and the application of equitable principles. Syllogistically, the 
State then declares there is no room for further review—simply, the issues 
before the Court have been decided against Blackhawk by the Director of 
State Lands. This, indeed, is to invite rule by men, not laws. 
II. The District Court properly found: 
A. The royalty provisions of Article III, Second (b) are vague 
and ambiguous. 
The royalty provisions of the State Lease provide, in pertinant 
part, as follows: 
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights 
and privileges aforesaid, hereby covenants and agrees as follows: 
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 
15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a) At the rate of 15<t per ton of 2000 lbs. of coal 
produced from the leased premises and otherwise disposed of, or 
(b) At the rate pevailing, at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal lessees of land 
of similar character on coal leases issued by the United States at that 
time, 
whichever is higher... (R. 244) 
To succesfully withstand challenge, this lease provision must 
adhere to the following standards: 
The lands covered by the referenced leases must be within a 
well-defined area or distance. It must be possible to make an exact 
determination, on a case-by-case basis, of which reference leases 
qualify to trigger the change in royalty. The reference leases should 
cover the same quality or rank of coal, the same mining method, and 
possibly, the same approximate depth. Errebo, "Coal Royalties". 26 
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 86 (1980) 
The royalty provision in the State Lease fails to meet any of 
these standards: Firstly, there is no well defined area. Ralph Miles, former 
Director of the Division, interpreted it to be land in the same general area. 
(Ralph Miles deposition of October 15, 1987, p. 10) (R. 319) John T. Blake, 
Mineral Resource Specialist for the Division, was much more restrictive i.e. 
he claimed it meant lands within the same mining operation. (John T. Blake 
deposition of June 10, 1987, pages 12, 13, 28 and 29 ) (R. 321) 
The phrase "land of similar character" as contained in this 
royalty section was scrutinized by the Office of the Legislative General 
Counsel and that office concluded: 
.. .the term of "land of similar character" is so vague as to defy 
a reasonable definition. Initially the problem becomes one of kind, i.e. 
similar in what regard—size, productivity, value. Assuming, 
arguendo, that similarity can be established, the second problem 
arises when it is attempted to establish the magnitude of the lands 
available for comparison, i. e. does the land have to be similar to land 
in the same country, state, or region or is the entire United States 
available for comparative similarities. 
Without further explanation in the lease itself or without 
knowing the intent of the parties, any definition given herein would 
be totally inconclusive. (R. 317) 
In his deposition, Douglas E. Johnson, Royalty Audit Supervisor 
and Trust Accountant for the Division, opined that the phrase had no 
significance in establishing the prevailing royalty rate: 
Q. So it is not what is being paid for Federal lessees for land of 
similar character. It is what you say the regulation says. 
A. Similar character doesn't enter into it, other than you have 
to look at... to see if it is a surface or a subsurface mine. 
Q. I think you said, also, that land of similar character really 
doesn't mean anything under this circumstance. 
A. No it doesn't. The only difference that it made was whether 
or not not it was a subsurface or surface mine. (P. 9 and 10, 
Deposition of October 15, 1987) (R. 330) 
The words of the Lease held no meaning for Mr. Johnson. 
The ending phrase in the royalty provision "at that time" has 
met with varying interpretations at the hands of Division personnel. John T. 
Blake was of the opinion that it meant "at the time that Blackhawk was 
mining coal from the State lease and paying royalty on the State lease." 
(P. 14, Deposition of June 10, 1987) (R. 333) Ralph Aiello suggests that the 
phrase refers to the same time frame as "at the beginning of the quarter". 
(P. 8, 9, Deposition of September 2, 1987) (R. 334) In his deposition, 
Douglas Johnson thought it meant at the time each royalty payment was 
made (P. 10, Deposition of October 15, 1987) (R. 335) 
The personnel within the Division administering the lease are 
not in concert in their understanding of the lease language. Each person 
seems to have his own version. It is not necessary to scrutinize the phrases 
out of context to reveal fatal ambiguities. Viewed as a whole the provision is 
just as ambiguous. The escalation portion of the royalty clause at Article III, 
Second(b) is so vague, uncertain and ambiguous as to be unenforceable: the 
only rate that is certain and understandable is the 15* per ton. 
B. The royalty provision of Article HI, Second(b) must be 
construed narrowly against the State and the course of action of the parties 
dictates that the rate should be held at SO. 15 per ton. 
In the construction of ambiguous contracts, the courts generally 
hold that it is to be construed strictly against the contract drafter (in this 
case, the State) and favorably to the other contracting party or parties. 
Wells Fargo Bank NA v. Midwest Realty and Finance Inc, 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 
1975); Sears v. Ricmersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) 
More than twenty-eight years have elapsed since the State 
lease was issued. The form used was one employed by the State for many 
years before. For more than a decade and a half after its issuance, no heed 
was given to this royalty provision because both State and Federal 
governments had historically based coal royalties on cents per ton of coal 
produced. In the past, both governments paid less attention to the royalty 
issue than to the benefits derived from the development of the resource— 
the jobs generated, the impetus to new industry and the new tax base that 
such development provided. This was the genius behind the Federal mining 
laws (30 U.S.C. S 21, et seq.) and the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as 
amended (41 Stat. 437, et seq.). The intent of the parties twenty-eight years 
ago is a controlling factor and what that original intent was is a far cry from 
what the State is urging today—a strained, contradictory construction, at 
variance with law and based simply on the lessor's audit and demand made 
after an unsuccessful attempt to readjust the lease and a quarter of a 
century after the lessor and lessee had signed the document. 
In the construction of an amiguous contract provision, to determine the 
intent of the parties, the entire contract is to be reviewed, with the 
ambiguous provision read in relation to other pertinent provisions. Sears, 
Ibid. The course of performance of the parties is to be considered as 
evidencing the parties' true intentions. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel 534 P.2d 85 
(Utah, 1975; Monroe, Inc. v. JackB. Parson Construction Co, 604 P.2d 901 
(Utah, 1979) This is the doctrine of practical construction and, if the parties 
by their performance and actions, have demonstrated an interpretation of 
the contract, then the court can enforce it accordingly. 
Here, the parties conclusively demonstrated by actions and 
performance, the understanding that the proper and accepted royalty rate 
during the audit period was $0.15 per ton of coal. 
In MonroQ supra, the parties entered into a written purchase 
agreement for highway paving materials. Subsequently, they orally agreed 
to amend the purchase order in several respects. Plaintiff confirmed these 
contract changes in a letter addressed to the Defendant; the Defendant did 
not respond to the letter, but accepted delivery of the materials from the 
Plaintiff. The Court applied the UCC Title 70A §2-201(1), (2) and the 
doctrine of practical consideration holding that even though Defendant did 
not respond to and was silent as to the confirmatory letter, the Defendants 
actions evidenced intent of the parties to consummate the agreement as 
modified.. 
This case bears a striking similarity with Monroe. On 
January 7, 1982, Blackhawk's counsel had delivered his letter to the Division 
reiterating the royalty to be paid by Biackhawk. The letter served a 
clarifying purpose in that the Division had finally abandoned its year-long 
attempt to readjust the royalty rate, had offered Biackhawk a new lease with 
a beginning royalty rate of four percent, escalating to eight percent (which 
Biackhawk had rejected) and had voiced the expectation that future royalties 
would be "at the same rate prevailing for similar Federal coal leases in the 
area". (R. 299) The January 7, 1982 letter clearly stated Blackhawk's 
position and re-emphasized that "Biackhawk will continue to pay to the 
State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of 15$ per ton in compliance with 
Article 111(a) of the original lease agreement,, since the provisions of Article 
IIKb) of this agreement are inapplicable at the present time". Ibid. It 
should be remembered that this letter was written in response to Mr. John T. 
Blake's letter of January 4, 1982, in which he wrote that "should Blackhawk 
Coal Company choose to reject my invitation for lease amendment, they may 
continue to operate under the original lease until otherwise advised". (R. 
297) There was no response from the Division to Blackhawk's letter of 
January 7, 1982 . There was total silence from the State until the audit and 
demand letter of October 15, 1985, more than three and one-half years 
later. And the Division had continued to accept royalty payments at the 
rate of 15<t per ton for so long as Blackhawk had continued to produce coal 
from the leased premises. 
These are the precise circumstances which dictated the lower 
court's decision in which it said: 
The factual situation in this case is more supportive of plaintiff's 
motion than were the facts in the Plateau Mining case in that there 
was an attempt by the defendants to renegotiate the lease in question 
to a percentage of gross value of coal produced in 1981. That attempt 
was never pursued by defendants and even withdrawn in January of 
1982. Plaintiff, at that time, was informed by John T. Blake, Mineral 
Resources Specialist of the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy 
Department, Division of State Lands and Forestry, as follows: Should 
Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation for lease 
adjustment, they may continue to operate under the original Lease 
Agreement until otherwise advised. 
The plaintiff responded in the letter to Mr. Blake on January 7, 
1982, as follows: Blackhawk will continue to pay to the State, on a 
quarterly basis, the royalty of $0.15 per ton in compliance with Article 
111(a) of the original Lease Agreement, since the provisions of Article 
111(b) of this Agreement are inapplicable at the present time. 
Thereafter, plaintiff paid and defendant accepted without 
comment or objection the $0.15 a ton in accordance with Article III 
Second(a) of the lease. (Addendum 4) 
C. "A t the rate prevailing", as that phrase is used in Article HI 
Second!b), the State Lease, is not self-executing; until the royalty rate is 
determined by the parties, Blackhawk is underno obligation to pay a royalty 
different than that specified i.e. SO. 15 per ton. 
Considering the vague, ambiguous nature of the royalty 
provision, the assertion by the State that it is self-executing borders on the 
improbable. The State would have the lessee responsible for adjusting the 
royalty rate. The Attorney General's memorandum on the Division audit of 
State land leases, dated March 7,1986 (R. 345) suggests that the royalty 
clause is self-executing and analogous to the "adjustable rate mortgage". The 
analogy is patently inappropriate. The mortgage company gives notice of 
the interest change; it is not the borrower's provence to scamper around 
attempting to determine on his own what might or might not be the 
applicable interest rate. 
Admittedly, it is Blackhawk's responsibility to notify the State 
on each quarterly payment, the rate on which the royalty is paid, still, for 
Article III Second (b) to take effect, the State must: give Blackhawk notice 
of the royalty rate increase and give Blackhawk an opportunity for a hearing 
on such increase. Blackhawk's posture is this: Failure to provide it with 
notice and an opportunty to be heard is a deprivation of a property interest 
without due process. The Division failed to provide any such notice and 
opportunity for hearing. 
The lower court, in its Memorandum Decision of February 24, 
1988, Plateau Mining Co., et ai v. The Utah Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, et ai, Civil No. 14890, recognized this complexity when it posed 
these questions: "**at the beginning of the reporting quarter what is the 
prevailing federal rate and who makes the determination, the lessor or the 
lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a determination as to 
what federal rate prevails and in what area is it prevelant? Who makes the 
determination that the land in the state lease and the federal lease are 
similar in character and what is the basis for determining similarity? What 
time period is used to determine federal leases issued.. .at that time' and 
who makes that determination? Even if the prevailing federal rate is 
established, does it apply to the value of the coal removed' as stated in the 
federal regulation or to the gross sales value' as used by the State Auditor in 
his assessment, and who makes that determination?'' (at P. 5) These are 
unanswered questions which compel the lower court to conclude that 
"subparagraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal obligation on the 
lessee since the identifiable factors necessary for self-execution could not 
independently be ascertained by either party•". (Emphasis supplied) Ibid. 
atP.6 (Addendum 6) 
D. The State is estopped from retroactiveiy appiying the 
prevaiiing Federairate. 
Governmental immunity from estoppel is a derivative of the 
doctrine conferring the sovereign entity with immunity from suit without its 
consent. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §123 (1966); annot 1 A.L.R. 2d 
338, 340. The modern trend in both legislative and judicial thinking is 
toward the concept that the citizen has a right to expect the same standard 
of honesty, justice and fair dealing in his contact with the state or other 
political entity, which he is legally accorded in his dealings with other 
individuals. Therefore, the rule against estopping a governmental body 
should not be used by the state to obtain unjust enrichment or undeserved 
gains at the expense of a citizen. Finch v. Mathews, 443 P.2d 833 (1968); 
Edwards v. City of Benton, 67 Wash. 2d 598, 409 P.2d 153 (1965) 
Generally speaking, equitable estopplel must be cautiously 
applied against the State if it is acting in its governmental capacity, 
nevertheless, the State can be estopped whether acting in a governmental or 
proprietary capacity. Celebrity Qub, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
In Finch v. Matthews, supra, the court left little doubt as to the 
extent to which the doctrine could be extended, saying: 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel will be applied against the state or 
against a municipality or other political entity when acting in its 
governmental as well as when acting in its proprietary capacity, when 
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice and the exercise of its 
governmental powers will not be impaired thereby, (at page 842) 
(Emphasis in the original) 
There is no doubt that Blackhawk will suffer an injustice if the 
State is permitted to deny the application of equitable estoppel; it will suffer 
a material financial loss, simply because the State is attempting to 
accomplish at this late date what it might have done at the time the lease 
was ripe for readjustment. By applying the doctrine, there could be no 
impairment of the State's government process. 
There is nothing more coldly callous than the State's denial that 
Biackhawk will suffer a material financial loss when it says that all costs are 
passed on by Plaintiff to its parent companies and eventually the utilities 
and consumers in the Midwest." (Brief of Appellants, P. 37) The State's 
tardiness in handling the lease readjustment is to be paid for by some 
unknown, faceless utility rate payer in the Midwest. What an incredible 
rationalization! 
The State complains that "The trial court erred when it rewrote 
the parties' lease by limiting royalties to $ .15 per ton". (Brief of Appellants 
at P. 11) This is a serious mischaracterization of the lower court's judgment. 
That court was, we submit, adhering to the broad equitable 
principle ennumerated in State eirel Washington Paving Co. v. Clausen, 90 
Wash. 450, 452, 156 P.2d 554 (1916): 
We have repeatedly held that in its business relations with 
individuals, the state must not expect more favorable treatment than 
is fair between men. State exrei. Giiiette v. C/ausen, 44 Wash. 437, 
441. 87 P. 498; Spokane Street Ry. Co. v. Spokane Faiis, 6 Wash. 521. 
33 P. 1072; State ex rel Maddaugh v. Ritter, 14 Wash. 649, 650, 134 
P. 492; Ettor v. [City of]Tacoma, 11 Wash. 267, 275, 137 P. 820. The 
State in its dealings with individuals should be held to "resolute good 
faith." State of [Indiana] v. Miik, (C.C.) 11 F.389. 
The State argues that estoppel is applicable only in very limited 
circumstances when the State is acting in its governmental capacity 
(Appellants' brief, page 33) The State looks to Duchesne County v. Tax 
Commission, 140 P.2d 335 (Utah 1943) and Justice Larsen's failure to find a 
distinction between governmental and proprietary capacity and that Justice's 
conclusion that everything the State does is governmental (Ibid, page 343). 
Three other justices concurred in the result that the lands in question (State 
school lands) are not taxable, but did not necessarily concur in Justice 
Larsen's simplistic analysis (Wolfe, Chief Justice, McDonough, Justice, Wade, 
Justice, each concurring in result only) (Ibid, pages 343, 344) 
The majority of courts have refused to adopt Justice Larsen's 
conclusion. In Celebrity, supra, this Court has looked with approval to the 
case of Metropolitan Park, a District of Tacoma, v. State Department of 
NaturaiResources, 539 P.2d 854 (Washington 1975) which unequivocally 
stated that "when the state undertakes to dispose of public lands, either by 
sale or lease, it then acts in its propietary capacity". (At page 858) In 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1975), the dissent of 
Justice Maughn clearly expressed this view, in which he said: "Here the State 
acts to dispose of public lands by lease. It thus acts in its proprietary 
capacity, an equitable estoppel is a proper remedy." (Page 700) 
In Radioffv. State, 116 Mich. App. 745, 323 NW2d 541, 
remanded 330 NW2d 692 (Mich.), the State's actions in leasing land for 
gravel were held to be proprietary in nature. 
Morgan's importance here lies in this Court's holding that 
estoppel was available against the Board of State Lands if the following 
elements were present: 
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant Board) by 
his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he 
ought to speak, intentionally or through cuipable negiigence induces 
another (plaintiffs) to believe certain facts to exist and that such other 
(plaintiffs) acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and 
acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the former (land 
board) is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. (Emphasis 
added) (Page 697) 
This Court, in Celebrity, supra, quoted with approval West v. 
Department of Social and Health Services, 21 Wash. App. 577, 586 P.2d 516 
(1978) wherein that court said: 
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
are: 
(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, 
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement or act, and 
(3) Injury to such party resulting from allowing the first party 
to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. (at page 
518) 
All of the elements for estoppel are here: 
(a) By its acts, representations, admissions and silence, 
the Division led Blackhawk to believe the proper royalty rate was $0.15 per 
ton throughout the audit period; 
(b) The Division was fully aware, at the time of the 
attempted readjustment, that the rate paid was $0.15 per ton; 
(c) Throughout the period of attempted readjustment the 
Division accepted, without comment, the royalty payments at $0.15 per ton; 
(d) At no time during the attempted readjustment did 
the Division allege an underpayment of royalty or suggest the rate should be 
set in pursuance of Article III, Second(b); 
(e) Blackhawk s clarifying letter of January 7, 1982, 
reiterating its intent to continue to pay royalty at the rate of $0.15 was met 
with complete silence by the Division; the Division, however, continued to 
accept payments at said rate and the Division's silence continued for three 
and one-half more years until the Audit Report; 
(f) Blackhawk relied in good faith upon the impression 
conveyed by the State through its conduct (its silence); 
(g) Blackhawk acted at all times with reasonable 
diligence and prudence; and 
(h) Blackhawk will suffer a serious and irreparable 
damage if the State is permitted to deny the existence of these facts. 
Because the State failed in its readjustment efforts, it should be 
estopped from using this avenue to accomplish that which it could not 
achieve otherwise; the State is estopped from retroactively escalating the 
royalty rate and demanding payment of alleged past due royalties, plus 
interest and penalties. 
E. By its failure to properly invoke the Federal prevailing rate 
clause in a proper and timely fashion, the State is barred by laches, waiver 
and the Statute of Limitations 
Laches arises from a delay coupled with the resultant 
disadvantage to the other party because of the delay. Papanikolas Brothers 
Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Association, 535 P-2d 1256 
(1975) 
The elements necessary to support laches are : A lack of 
diligence on the part of the Defendant (the State in this case); an injury to 
Plaintiff (Blackhawk in this case) due to such lack of diligence. Both 
elements are present in this case. The Division waited an unconscionable 
three and one-half years before demanding payment of added royalties; 
Blackhawk had mined coal to comply with contractual arrangements with 
others depending on the $0.15 per ton royalty. Coal was mined which 
otherwise might not have been mined at a higher royalty, and interest was 
demanded by the State at rates as high as eighteen percent per annum. 
Because of its protracted delay, it would be most inequitable to permit the 
State to maintain such claims. 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
American Savings & Loan Association v. Biomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 
P.2d 1 (1965). The following three elements must be present to establish 
waiver: 
1. A right, benefit or advantage must have been in 
existence at the time the waiver occurred; 
2. The waiving party must not have had knowledge of 
the right, and; 
3. The waiver may be expressed or implied, but the 
waiving party must have intended to relinquish his right. (Ibid, at 3) (See 
also Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 312 
(1936) All three elements are present in this case. 
Assuming arguendo that Article III, Second (b) was not void 
but was sufficient to have some legal effect, then the State would be said to 
have a right to apply the escalation provision. Obviously, the State had 
knowledge of the existence of the escalation provision because it attempted 
to enforce it. The intent to waive that right may be express or implied. 
Silence constitutes conduct which evidences an intent to waive if there is a 
duty to speak. Daiton v. LeBIanc, 350 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1965). The Division 
had a responsibility to speak, especially in the light of Blackhawk's counsel's 
letter of January 7, 1982, which stated in out-and-out terms that the 
escalation provision was inapplicable and that the royalty would continue to 
be paid at the regular rate. The only inference that can be drawn from three 
and one-half years of silence is that the State had waived it right to increase 
the royalty rate. It must not be forgotten that the State quietly continued to 
accept the quarterly royalty payments—at the regular rate—without a 
murmer. This smacks of an ongoing waiver or relinquishment of the State's 
right (assuming, of course, such right ever existed). 
In its argument, the State has lost sight of the fact that the 
blame for any loss, if any there is, can be laid at its own feet. The State, by 
contract, had the right to readjust the terms of the lease at the expiration of 
the twenty-year term. It sat on its hands and did nothing. When it 
awakened to the fact that it was tardy and had lost that opportunity, it 
started on a new tack; it would amend the lease —another way of 
accomplishing a readjustment. The holding in Rosebud CoalSoles Company, 
supra, brought an end to this belated stratagem and that effort was 
abandoned, but with the fatal caveat contained in the Blackhawk letter of 
January 4, 1982, that "they (Blackhawk) may continue to operate under the 
original lease agreement until otherwise advised." Blackhawk was not 
"otherwise advised" until nearly four years later when the State brought 
forth the Audit Report. 
Utah Code §78-12-23(2) provides that: 
An action, upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in §78-12-22 
must be brought within six years. If a cause of action commences upon the 
breach of the contract, the Statute of Limitation begins to run when the 
breach occurs. A'ouiis v. Standard Oil Company of California, 746 P.2d 1182 
(Utah App. 1987); Upland Industries Corporation v. Pacific Gamble Robinson 
Company, 684 P.2d 638 (Utah 1984). 
The State alleges that Blackhawk underpaid royalties beginning 
with the first quarter of 1979. This must be based upon the writing (State 
Lease and Article III, Second (bl) and the breach in 1979. Thus, the State 
would have been required to bring its action within six years of the alleged 
breach. Instead, it saw the light of day in the form of the State's 
counterclaim in this cause on August 22, 1986. Although the State was fully 
aware of the rate being paid, there was not a demand for payment until May 
16, 1986.2 ^ would be farfetched, indeed, to expect the State to claim, in 
good faith, that it was unaware of the alleged underpayment of royalty until 
completion of the audit report in October of 1985. It would have to be the 
State's contention that it knew there was an underpayment, but that 
underpayment was not quantified until October 1985. Thus, the Defendants' 
claim for royalties is late; the State is barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
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 The audit royalty report was released October 15, 1985, (R. 304) under 
cover of the Director's letter of even date which noted the findings and 
allowed for a reconsideration request if Blackhawk disagreed with the 
findings. The Division declined to make any readjustments to the report and 
by letter of March 27, 1986, (R.313) demanded payment within thirty days. 
On April 21. 1986, the Utah Supreme Court issued a decision in Adkins v. 
The Division of State Lands and Forestry, 719 P.2d 524. As a result of this 
decision, the Division recinded the demand letter of March 27, 1986 and 
issued a new demand letter of May 16, 1986. (R. 314) 
F. The State's attempt to impose interest and penalties cannot 
be legally enforced. 
It is Blackhawk's position that the Division lacks the authority 
to impose interest penalties. The State has attempted to impose intrest rates 
ranging from six percent to eighteen percent applicable to the alleged 
underpaid royalty.3 If no royalties are due, no interest can be owing. Even 
if underpaid royalties are found owing, for a quarter such as the quarter 
commencing October 1, 1981 and ending December 31, 1981, the State 
nevertheless cannot impose interest thereon. Absent a contractual provision, 
pre-judgment interest can be imposed only by a trial court after a final 
determination. 
Article I of the State Lease provides that: "This lease is granted 
subject in all respects to and under the conditions of the laws of the State of 
Utah and existing rules and regulations and such operating rules and 
regulations as may hereafter be approved and adopted by the State Land 
Board." (Emphasis added) (Addendum 1) 
§65-1-96, Utah Code, provides, in essence, that ail mineral 
leases issued prior to the effective date of the act shall continue for the term 
3 For the purposes hereof, we have assumed that the six percent rate 
assessed from January 1, 1979 to June 30, 1981, and the ten percent rate 
assessed from July 1, 1981 to November 30, 1982, represent the statutory 
pre-judgment rates for the periods involved; that the eighteen percent rate 
represents the rate under Rule 3(c) of the Rules and Regulations of the Utah 
Division of State Lands and Forestry adopted November 4, 1982, imposing a 
fee of 1.5 percent per month on all "outstanding overdue royalty". 
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specified therein and "shall be subject to the conditions and provisions 
contained therein;..." Thus, the State Lease was subject to those rules and 
regulations in effect on February 16, 1960 (the date of issuance of the State 
Lease) and "operating" rules and regulations adopted thereafter by the 
Board. 
The lease clearly differentiates "operating rules and regulations" 
from "existing rules and regulations". Operating rules and regulations relate 
to the operation of the leasehold. Neither "operating" nor "operation" is a 
term of art but in most instances appears to refer to activities leading to the 
production of oil and gas, thus, it has has been held not to include the 
payment of royalties. Bouterie v. Kleinpeter, 258 La. 605, 245 So.2d 548; 
see also Adolph v. Sterns, 235 Kan. 622, 684 P.2d 372 "Operating rules and 
regulations" do not include royalty matters let alone interest on royalty 
underpayments. Royalty terms are financial terms not operating terms. If 
the board had the power to alter the financial terms of a lease by the simple 
expedient of setting new rules and regulations, a lessee would become the 
captive of pure bureaucratic whim and fancy—a lessee would lose all 
contractual certainty. 
As we have noted, there was no rule or regulation in existence 
when the State Lease was issued. The terms of the Lease preclude the 
application of Rule 3(c) which was promulgated in 1982 (twenty-two years 
after the lease issued). Further, the 1982 rule does not govern or relate to a 
lessee's operations on the land. The 1982 interest rule cannot be applied to 
any royalty deficiency which could be assessed under the State Lease. 
Putting the legal arguments aside for the moment, and looking 
at the situation in light of simple fairness, the State should not be permitted 
to impose an eighteen percent interest charge. Generally, interest simply 
reflects the "time value" of money; interest as contemplated under Rule 3(c) 
reflects something more—a sense of the punitive. What Rule 3(c) says to the 
lessee subject to the rule is, if you don't pay your royalty on time, interest at 
1.5 percent per month will accrue. Where, as here, the State tries to 
retroactively adjust the royalty rate without notice of underpayment to the 
lessee, the imposition of an eighteen percent interest rate is simply 
inequitable and unreasonable. 
G. The States royaltypolicyrule is invalid because the State 
failed to comply with the Utah A dministrative Rule Making Act. 
The lower court held that a legally binding lease cannot be 
altered or added to by rules and regulations adopted subsequently. (R.) The 
court's ruling is to the effect that the State, in formulating and announcing its 
royalty policy, must follow the procedure specified in the 1985 Utah 
Administrative Rule Making Act, UCA §63-46(a)-3 (1986). A "rule" is 
defined by the Act as being ".. .a statement made by an agency that applies 
to a general class of persons, rather than specific persons and: (i) imple-
ments or interprets policy made by statute; or (ii) prescribes the policy of 
the agency in the absence of express statutory policy; or (iii) prescribes the 
administration or the agency's functions or describes its organization, 
procedures and operations". §63-46(a)-8(i) 
The States royalty policy requiring an eight percent royalty 
rate is a rule within the contemplation of the cited statute and cannot, 
therefore, be enforced retroactively, in the present or prospectively, without 
compliance with the rule making process. 
In Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 
1986) the Commission had, in 1962, granted a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity to Mobile Telephone, Inc. to operate a two-way 
mobile telephone and a paging system. From 1962 to 1983, the Commission 
granted other, similar certificates. The Federal Communications Commission 
deregulated radio frequencies in paging services and a given number of 
frequencies were alloted to Utah on a first-come-first-serve basis. In 1983, 
a company inquired of the Commission whether a Certificate of Necessity 
was required, and in a written response, the Commission answered in the 
negative. This constituted a reversal of the Commissions earlier policy and 
was a relinquishment of the Commissions jurisdiction over one-way radios. 
The petitioners in the case argued that the letter constituted either a "rule" 
under the meaning of the Rule Making Act or an "order" within the meaning 
of the Public Utilities Act. UCA 1953 §54-7-13; Repl. Vol. 6A 1974. The 
Commission argued that it was not a rule making within the meaning of the 
statute because it did not have general applicability. 
This Court acknowledged that there are situations when an 
agency may state a new policy in informal adjudications, but the problem 
was different where an agency, through adjudication, makes a change in 
clear law "as when it overrules a batch of its own decisions, especially if 
private parties have acted in reliance on the overruled decisions." Quoting 
from K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §7.25 at 122 (2nd Edition, 
1978) This Court concluded in Williams, supra, that the Commission's 
decision was generally applicable; the decision altered the rights of all 
certificate holders; the letter interpreted the scope of the Commission's 
regulatory powers through "interpreting the law"; and, in so acting, the 
Commission made a "change in clear law". The court ruled that: 
"Under all these circumstances we conclude that the Commission 
cannot reverse its long settled position regarding the scope of its 
jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change without 
following the requirements of the Utah Administrative Rule Making 
Act. Ibid, at 766-77 
In applying the rationale of the Wiiiiams case here, it can be 
concluded that the State's royalty policy announced in 1985 was a rule. In 
the absence of a compliance with the Rule Making Act, it is void. The State's 
would-be policy affects all state lessees holding coal leaes of the nature 
under discussion here; thus, it affects a "class of persons". As stated, the 
policy represents a departure or "change in the clear law". 
Until it complies with the Rule Making Act, the State is 
precluded from enforcing its would-be policy, retroactively or otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
The State Lease was issued in 1960 and no question was raised 
by the State as to the royalty rate payable thereunder until the lease 
provision was before the Division and the Board in 1981 and it was decided 
to attempt a tardy readjustment of the lease itself. The royalty rate was not 
increased; the rate remained at $0.15 per ton of coal produced. The lease 
provision came up again in 1982 when the Division attempted an increase of 
the "annual minimum royalty'. Again, the royalty rate was not increased. 
Relying on the original lease royalty rate and the silence of the 
State, Blackhawk continued to mine coal and pay royalties at the rate of 
$0.15 per ton of coal produced—all without objection from the State. Now, 
the State is trying to do something it hadn't been able to do; retroactively 
invoke an ambiguous lease provision which, unfortunately for the State, has 
already been waived. 
If the State insists that the law requires the receipt of full value 
from the disposition of trust lands, then the simple answer is that the State 
has failed under the law. If the State complains that the "contract created by 
the trial court runs directly counter to the law and public policy of this State" 
then it has conveniently blinded itself to the fact that the State created the 
contract; the trial court merely found its terms so vague and ambiguous as 
to be completely unenforceable. (Brief of Appellant P. 19) The State 
denounces the lower court saying that "The Court should not delete or 
rewrite the contract." (Brief of Appellant P. 23) The States insistance 
notwithstanding, the court did not "create" or "rewrite" the contract; the 
court merely concluded that it could not make a silk purse out of this sows 
ear—that is neither creating nor rewriting the contract. But on the other 
hand, if there were ambiguity, then the State would have the court 
"interpret or clarify the ambiguous provision". (Brief of Appellant P. 23) 
The State is asking the lower court to abandon common sense and with some 
sort of judicial legerdemain "create" an understandable contract provision. 
The very thing the State complains of in the lower court is what it now asks 
this Court to do. 
The stakes are not inconsiderable; the prize the State seeks is 
$3,150,775.64—a tidy sum in anybody's lexicon. But, for the reasons 
assigned herein, it would be unconscionable and unjust for the State to 
prevail. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of October, 1988. 
"WIFffiwl 
By 
Attorneyslfor Blackfliawk Coal Company 
136 SoutWMain Street, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City. Utih 84101 
PLAINTIFIWPELLEE 
•gii 
M M $ — ADDENDUM 1 — 
K3-LB 
MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION MINERAL LEASE NO. 1 O 1 4 0 
GRANT: S c h o o l 
NO., m&: 
Utah State Lease for 
C 
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE AND AGREEMENT entered mo in duplicate this 16th... day of .. ?<fimv*ry
 f w J8P[ 
by arid between the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in ochaif of the State of Utah, hereinafter called the Lessor, and 
CAHEON DF/QiOPiENT CCMPAKY 
P. 0 . Box 506 
Helpar* Utah 
party of the second part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
WITNESSETH: That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be r^'d and the covenants to he observed by the Lessee, as here-
inafter set forth, does hereby grant and lease to the Lessee the exclusive right and privilege to mine, remove, and dispose of all of the 
said minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in v W D O U County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
All of Section Thirty-two (32), Tcrwnshlp Twalvo (12) South-, Rang*? Illno (?) Ea*t# 
Salt Laka Meridian, 
containing a total of 6 / < 0 « U U acres, more or less, together with the ri;;hr to use and occupy so much of the surface of said land as 
may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining, removal, apd di*po*nl of *aid minerals, according to the provisions of this 
lease, for the period ending ten year; after the first day of lanuary next succeeding the date hereof and as lone thereafter as said minerals may 
be produced in commercial quantities' from said lands, or Lessee sh:ill continue to make the payments required by Article III hereof, upon 
condition that nt the end of each twenty (20) year period succccdin'4 the first diiy of the year in which tlvs lease is issued, such readjustment 
of terms and conditions may be made as the Lessor mov dctcimme to be necessary M the interest of the Stnic. 
ARTlCUl I 
This lease is granted subject in all respects to and under the renditions of the laws of the State of Utah and exisring rules and regulations 
and such operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board. 
ART/C/E 11 
This lease covers only the mining, removal, and d» posnl of the minerals specified in this lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the 
tfye Lessor of the discovery of any minerals excepting those enumerated herein. 
ARTICLE III 
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights and p-ivilegc. afores-ud, hereby covenants and agree*, as follows: 
FIRST: To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lc.i-c the sum uf fifty (50) cents rcr acre per annum. All such annual 
payments of rental shall be made in advance on the 2nd day of January of each year, except the i rental which is payable 
on the execution of this lease. All rentals s>hall be credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue. 
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15£ per ton of 2CC0 lbs. of coal produced from the leaded premises and othciwi^e disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of thi» quarter for which payment is being made, for federal lessees of land of similar char-
acter under coal leases issued by the United States at that time, 
If the coal produced from the leased premises is washed before sale or other disposition by Lessee, Lessee mav pay royalty on the washed 
product only, provided Lessee maintains accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased premises can be 
ascertained and complies with all regulations and directives i.v-ued by Lessor to prevent waste and to insure that royalty is paid on all washed 
coal originating from the leased premises. 
THIRD: To prepare and forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which 
the material is produced, a certified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, and 
such other additional information as the State Land Board may from time to time require. 
FOURTH: To keep at the mine of fire clear, accurate and detailed maps en tr.vur; cloth, en a scale not more than 50 feet to the inch, 
of the workings in each section of the leased lands an I on the Kinds adjacent, said maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land cor-
ner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and t> fumi. h to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such 
maps and such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer and all maps certified 
to by him. 
FIFTH; Not to fence or otherwise make tnaccessibc to stock any watering place on the premises without first obtaining the written consent 
of Lessor, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or riitaurfncc water available or capable of hcing made available for domestic 
or irrigation use. 
SIXTH: Not to assign this 1-asc or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premises, or any of the rights and privileges 
herein granted, without the written consent of the Lessor being first had and obtained. 
ARTICLE IV 
The Lessor hereby excepts and reserves from the operation of this lease: 
FIRST: The right to permit for joint or several use such c isements or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may 
be necessary or appropriate to the working of these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits 
or for other use. 
SECOND: The right to use, lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of the surfarc of said lands or any part thereof, under existing State laws 
or laws hereafter enacted, insofar as said surface is not necessary for the Lcsee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the leased substances there-
in, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those leased hereby, which may be contained in said lands so long as the recovery of such de-
posits does not unreasonably interfere with Lessee's rights herein granted. 
ARTICLE V 
Upon failure or refusal of the Lessee to accept the readjustment of terms and conditions demanded by the Lessor at the end of any twenty-
year period, such failure or refusal thall work a forfeiture of the lease und the same shall be canceled. 
ARTICLE VI 
In case of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of this lease, all underground timbering supports, shaft linings, rails and 
other installations necessary for the support of underground workings o( any mines, and all rails or head frames and all installations which 
cannot be removed without permanent injury' to the premises and all constriction and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation 
for any min^s, upon or in the said lands shall be and remain a part of the tcalty .aul shall revert to the Lesror without further consideration or 
compensation r.nd shall be left by the Lessee in the lands. 
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said lands and all buildings, machinery, equipment and tools (other than the 
installations to become the property of Lessor as above provided), shall be and remain the propc.ty of Lc-:;ce and Lessee shall be entitled to, 
and may, within six (6) months ahcr such expiration, forfeiting, surrender or other termination of sr.id lease, or wi.hin such extension of 
time as may be granted by I essor, remove from the said lands such personal property and improvements, other than those items which are 
to remain the property of the Lessor ns above provided. 
Lessee shall, upon termination, of this lease or abandonment of the leased premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such 
part of the mine openings on the premises as Lessor shall request be sealed. • 
ARTICLE Vll 
It 6nall be the responsibility of the leasee to slope the sides of nil operations of a surface nature to an angle of not less than 45* or to 
erect a barrier around such operation as rhe State Land Board mav tcquire. Such sloping or fencing <hnll become a normal part of the opera-
tion of the lease so as to keep pace with such operation to the extent that such operation shall not constitute a hazard. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Lessee shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any water rights acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written per-
mission. Upon termination of this lease for any reason, all such rights acquired by application to the Utah Slate Tngineer shall revert to the 
Lessor as an appurtenance to the leased premises, and all such rights acquired by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase 
at Lessee's acquisition costs, provided that Lessor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if it docs not accept the same within thirty 
days after receipt thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
All of the terms, covenants, conditions, and obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, 
and assigns of the Lessee. 
ARTICLE X 
Lessee may terminate this lease at any time upon giving three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor and upon payment of all 
rents and royalties and other sums due and payable to the Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preser-
vation of the workings in such order and condition as to permit of the continued orvmnnn r,( tU» \*»%*~A _..,•_:,— 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE if ) BOARD 
fly. :/..44v^A^/-f----4---/.^^ 
r I DIRECTOR 
/ LESSOR 
C'->noN PF-VF;i.OPT-'!FivT COMPANY, a Utah 
P^esi'USr.t LESSEE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of 
} , , LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
19... pci.sonn'.ly appeared before me . 
the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that - „ executed Hie same. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of 19...—... 
My commission Expires: Notary Public, residing at: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CARBON 
On the I 9 i h day of MZZSlL 
LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
Jimer> T . ^ia-nnti 19...^ ?...^  personally appeared before me .. ... 
who being duly swom did say that he is an officer of ...C.:lI^b.0.n....D.C.y.eJ.^ i^ .li?.ILt....^ ..C^?J.,.:?..^ Jf. and that said instrument was signed 
, T n " | A r ,T 1 *\ !T M T"1 "^" X 
in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Directors, and said .... .,.«.!...1.V. 1 !..t .'. acknowl-
edged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of 19......... 
My commission Expires: 
2/9/60 
Notary Public, residing at: H e l r e r , U t a h 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
''"X: On the r.:.i..:.f.— day of '...'...' .:... 19...C, personally appeared before me Frank J. Allen, who being by me duly sworn did 
say that he is the Director of the State Land Board of the State of Ut;ih and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said Board by resolu-
tion of the Board, and said Frank J. Allen acknowledged to me that said Board executed the fame in behalf of the State of Utah. 
Given under my hand and seal this day of 
My commission Expires: -r%* / ^S„/*.- J^~ 
^ £LL£I.L... \9jfS" 
o; 
,4,: •K/ - • .*2^_,._* 
Notary Public, residing at; 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS & FORESTRY 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
ROOM 411 EMPIRE BUILDING 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801)533-5381 
Scott M.Matheson 
Governor 
Gordon E. Harmston 
Executive Director 
Dept. of Natural Reiourcet 
William K. Dinehart 
Director 
January 14, J981 
CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 667150 
Franklin Real Estate Company 
Attn: Mineral Land Dept. 
2 Broadway 
New York, NY 
10004 
RE: ML 18148 
Gentlemen: 
The above numbered lease was issued February 16, I960, with provision that the 
lessor may readjust terms and conditions as may be in the interest of the 
State following each 20 year period. Since the original lease has now 
concluded its 20 year period, it is lessors desire and intent to amend this 
lease to conform with our current standard lease form for coal, copies of 
which are enclosed* 
As you may appreciate, rental and minimum royalty rates are much different 
than in the old lease agreement of 20 years ago. Upon amendment our lease 
agreement will retain the anniversary date of the original lease but rentals 
and royalties as well as all other provisions will be in accordance with the 
new lease form. 
Please execute and return both copies of the new lease agreement within 30 
days for our confirmation. We will then return one copy for your records and 
you will have another 20 years on lands covered by the lease. 
Please contact me should you have any questions regarding this readjustment. 
Sincerely yours, 
JOHN T. BLAKE 
MINERAL RESOURCE SPECIALIST 
jf 
BOARD MEMBERS 
ADDENDU] 
STATE OF UTAH Scott M. Matheson. Governor 
NATURAL RESOURCES & ENERGY Temple A. Reynolds. Executive Director 
State Lands & Forestry William K. Dmehart, Division Director 
100 State Office Building • Salt Lake City. UT 84114 • 801-533-5381 
January 4, 1932 
CERTIFIED MAIL NO. 984491 
Blackhawk Coal Company 
c/o Hugh C. Garner & Associates 
Attn: Hugh C. Garner 
Suite 1100 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
RE: ML 18143 
Dear Mr. Garner: 
I am in receipt of your letter of December 28, 1981. You are correct in your 
understanding of the Land Board meeting of July 8, 1981. The Attorney 
General's Office, however, is not prepared to issue a formal opinion on this 
subject at this time. Consequently, we are not demanding that Blackhawk Coal 
Company accept readjustment of the lease at this time. 
My let ter of December 11, 1981, was merely an invitation for Blackhawk Coal 
Company to amend this lease with our current standard lease form, concurrent 
with the new lease year, at the readjusted royalty authorized by the Land 
Board. As pointed out in my let ter , the proposed lease amendment has the 
advantage of allowing the lessee to pay an annual minimum royalty of $3.00 per 
acre in lieu of the requirement for yearly commercial production. Should 
Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation for lease amendment, 
they may continue to operate under the original lease agreement until 
otherwise advised. 
Board/Jack Sawyers. Chairman. Southwestern •Warren Haycock, Bear River • Chandler St. John. Mountamlands 
Max Williams. Central • Paul Rattle. Southeastern • Hollis Hulllnger. Uintah Basin • George Buzlanis, Wasatch 
Dr. Walter O. Talbot. Ex officio 
CERTIFIED MAIL* NO.'984491 
Blackhawk Coal Company 
c/o Hugh C, Garner & Associates 
January 4-:<l98? 
Page 2 
Blackhawk Coal Company, as are all State mineral lessees, is expected to fully 
comply with all the terms and conditions of their State lease* As you are 
aware, the original lease, ML 18148, was issued for a primary term of ten 
years. It may only be extended from year to year beyond that primary term by 
commercial production. We look forward to receiving royalty payment on 
commercial production each and e^ery year so long as lessee continues to 
operate under the original lease agreemnent. Further, we expect to receive 
such future royalty payments at the same rate prevailing for similar federal 
coal leases in the area. 
Please advise your client accordingly. 
Sincerely yours, 
(J OOHN T. BLAKE 
MINERALS RESOURCE SPECIALIST 
JT3/mh 
cc: Mr. Dick Dewsnip 
Assistant Attorney General 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND 
FORESTRY, THE UTAH BOARD OF 
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN, 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, 
Defendants . 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ON MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 14943 
The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial 
summary judgment and has supported the same by their Memorandum 
of Legal Points and Authorities, Affidavits and supporting 
documents. The defendants have objected to the Motion and have 
filed their Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities and 
supporting documents and Affidavits. The Court finds that 
there is no dispute as to the material facts in this case and 
has concluded therefrom that the plaintiff is entitled to 
partial summary judgment as prayed for and grants the 
plaintiff's Motion. 
The factual situation is nearly identical to the 
fact situation as shown in Carbon Case No. 14390, Plateau 
Mining Company v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry, et a 
and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion in that 
case to show the reasoning of the Court and the legal analysis 
used by the Court in reaching its decision in this case. 
The factual situation in this case is more supportive 
of plaintifffs motion than were the facts in the Plateau Mining 
case in that there was an attempt by the defendants to 
renegotiate the lease in question to a percentage of gross 
value of coal produced in 1981. That attempt was never pursued 
by defendants and even withdrawn in January of 1982. Plaintiff, 
at that time, was informed by John T. Blake, Mineral Resources 
Specialist of the State of Utah, Natural Resources and Energy 
Department, Division of State Lands and Forestry, as follows: 
"Should Blackhawk Coal Company choose to reject my invitation 
for lease adjustment:, they may continue to operate under the 
original Lease Agreement until otherwise advised." 
The plaintiff responded in a letter to Mr. Blake on 
January 7, 1982, as follows: "Blackhawk will continue to pay to 
the State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of $.15 per ton in 
compliance with Article III(a) of the original Lease Agreement, 
since the provisions of Article 111(b) of this Agreement are 
inapplicable at the present time." 
Thereafter, plaintiff paid and defendant accepted 
without comment or objection the $.15 a ton in accordance with 
Article Ill(a) of the Lease. 
2 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to 
prepare a formal judgment in accordance with this decision. 
DATED this J^-/ ^ day of April, 1988. 
*!&' 
OYD BUNNELL, Diserrct Judge 
3 
Hugh C. Garner - 1161 
HUGH C. GARNER & ASSOCIATES, P . C . 
136 South Main S t r e e t 
S u i t e 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-5660 
A. John Davis - 0825 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
36 South State Street 
Suite 1850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (301) 531-8446 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE 
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH 
MILES, Director of the 
Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, THE UTAH BOARD OF 
STATS LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN, 
Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Natural 
Resources , 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff has filed its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, together with its Supporting Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities; Defendants have filed their Memorandum in 
HAY 11 1283 
* JUDGMENT 
* 
* 
* Civil No. 14943 
* 
* 
* 
* 
2 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. Plaintiff is represented by 
Hugh C. Garner; Defendants are represented by their counsel Gayle 
F. McKeachnie and Clark B. Allred. The court having considered 
the memoranda and exhibits submitted by the parties and having 
previously, on April 21, 1988, issued its Memorandum Decision on 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
NOW THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff owes no royalties, penalties or interest 
to Defendants on State of Utah coal lease No. ML-18148 as 
demanded in Defendants1 October 15, 1985 Royalty Audit Report. 
2. The judgment signed by this court in this case is a 
final order and judgment from which an appeal may proceed. 
3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys1 
fees in connection with this case. 
JZl ^ , * /^Zi DATED t h i s / / J day o f - ^ p r i > ; 1988 . 
BOYD BOWWELL / ^ 
Is tr ic t—Court Judg<=/ 7 
3 
The above judgment was prepared by Hugh C. Garner of 
and for Hugh C. Garner & Associates, P.C., attorney for 
Plaintiff, and was, prior to execution fay the court and pursuant 
to Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah, submitted to the following on this 
26th day of April, 1938. 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
David S. Christensen, Esq. 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq. 
Clark B. Allred, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior 
363 East Main Street 
Vernkl, Utah 84078 
ADDENDUM 6 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, and ) 
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE ] 
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH ! 
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND ] 
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF ] 
STATE LANDS AMD FORESTRY; THE ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ] 
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN, ! 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL ] 
RESOURCES, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 ON MOTIONS FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 14890 
The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from 
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the 
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should 
be construed in light of the parties course of performance; 
that the lease is not self-executing so as to place a legaL 
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher rate of royalty after 
the State accepted without qualification the payment of the 
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the 
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy 
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped 
from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the 
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and 
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their 
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted 
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State 
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally 
enforced. 
The defendants have objected to the granting of the 
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary judgment 
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state 
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining 
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on 
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period; 
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes 
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the 
Board of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff, 
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties 
pursuant to the regulation set by the 3oarc, 
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums 
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court 
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered 
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February 
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on 
the Motions as hereinafter stated. 
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Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part, 
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective 
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of 
those undisputed facts. There is no dispute as to the fact 
that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest 
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the 
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the 
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15, 
1955, and that the Lease provides as follows: 
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on 
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, 
royalty 
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal 
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise 
disposed of, or 
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the 
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of 
land of similar character under coal leases issued by the 
United States at that time, 
whichever is higher. . . . " 
That the lease was on a standard form provided by 
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the 
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in 
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form 
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the 
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C 
per ton. The payment was received and retained by the State 
without question or objection throughout the audit period and 
prior thereto from sometime in 1965. 
The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah 
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has 
two columns. One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed 
Percentage Basis. Plateau and their predecessors in interest 
filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of 
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15C per ton and 
left the other column blank. 
After the term of the lease had expired, December 
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook, 
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments. The 
audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was 
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of 
1985. 
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal 
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on 
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed. Based upon 
the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the 
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent 
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales 
Value of coal removed. 
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the 
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the 
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose 
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of 
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the State, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty 
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of 
the lease is ambiguous. 
The royalty provision is divided into two parts. 
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive 
determination and provides for 15C per ton on coal produced 
from the leased premises. 
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several 
faccors not immediately capable of definitive determination. 
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and 
provided as from what is stated. In other words, at the 
beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing 
federal rate and who makes that determination, the lessor or 
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a 
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is 
it prevalent? Who makes the determination that the land in the 
State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in 
character and what is the basis for determining similarity? 
What time period is used to determine federal leases "issued... 
at that time" and who makes that determination? Even if a 
prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the 
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation 
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in 
his assessment, and who makes that determination? 
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For these reasons, the Court has concluded that 
sub-paragraph (b) is not self-executing as to create a legal 
obligation on the lessee since the identifiable factors 
necessary for self-execution could not independently be 
ascertained by either party. 
Sub-paragraph (b) was written by the State for its 
benefit and since it is not self-executing, it would require 
some affirmitive action on their part to bring che provision of 
that sub-paragraph into an enforceable position other than a 
retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of 
sub-paragraph (a) without objection or comment. 
Under these circumstances, the Court must look to 
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease 
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (b), and to calculate the royalty 
under sub-paragraph (a). 
Since the State by an established course of conduct 
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that 
provided for 15c a ton, they are now precluded from asserting a 
different construction of the Lease where they took no 
sufficient or positive action to establish their now asserted 
construction to an ambiguous lease provision. 
Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not 
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further 
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ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will 
be, the Court will address other issues presented. 
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of 
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the 
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a 
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State 
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual. 
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the 
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon 
the 8% of value figure. The undisputed facts show that the 
State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of 
Article III of their own Lease and were made aware by the 
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its prececessors in 
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving 
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the 
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based 
upon 15C a ton. If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were 
going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did 
not do. By their conduct and failure to perform this duty, 
they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the 
acceptable ro.yalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon, 
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not 
have done had they known that the defendants were going to 
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insist upon the 8% of value provision. The great injustice 
that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants 
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record 
shows that to allow the imposition of the greater royalty, the 
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity 
under the State Lease. 
Even if the conclusion is reached that the defendants 
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be 
estopped from asserting the new royalty rate. No substantial 
adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants 
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty 
retroactively. The State can still proceed to lease coal lands 
on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State 
the maximum return. They still have the power to revise the 
wording of their coal leases to do away with any ambiguity and 
to carry out any legally established policy. 
Further, the record shows that the plaintiffs would 
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on 
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the 
State's position and the contemplated change in the royalty 
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would 
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result. 
The Court further finds that the State had no right 
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent 
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payments at the legal rate, or any penalty. A legally binding 
lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations 
adopted subsequently. 
The Lease does state that it is subject to such 
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved 
and adopted. Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean 
changes to or additions of monetary payment. "Operating Rules" 
has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical 
interpretation. Since the amount claimed by the State is not 
subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be 
due could not commence to run until demand is made. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for 
and denies defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to 
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion. 
DATED this <^>7~'^ day of February, 1988. 
BOYD ) BUNNELL, E^s^ri cc Judqe 
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